Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged, “As a result of that agreement, Walgreen, KSP and other purchasers were deprived of any generic version of Revlimid from at least 2019 through March 2022; have been forced to pay artificially high generic prices and face limited supplies of generic Revlimid beginning in March 2022; and will be deprived of the normal and expected results of generic competition in the Revlimid market until at least January 2026.”

Plaintiffs presented two claims for relief, including for alleged conspiracy in restraint of trade and monopolization.

In the prayer for relief, the plaintiffs requested a judgment for declaratory relief that the conduct alleged is in violation of the antitrust laws and injunctive relief against further alleged violations. The plaintiffs also requested for an award of Plaintiffs’ overcharge damages and costs of litigation.

Personally, I’m beyond outraged by the corporate greed demonstrated by all 7 companies responsible for this price-gouging scheme. According to Representative Katie Porter, the price for one oral capsule of Revlimid was $215 in 2005, $412 in 2013, $719 in 2017, and $763 in 2020. And according to Drugs.com, the price for all strengths is currently $877/capsule. That equates to $18,417 for 21 capsules or $239,421/year for thirteen 28-day cycles.

I hope Walgreen and KSP are successful and a class action lawsuit ensues so every patient and insurance company can receive overcharge damages too. More than anything, I pray the generic price will be reduced to 10% of the brand price so patients that don’t qualify for assistance aren’t expected to spend 30% of their AGI on this life-saving med.

Is anyone on this site in the same predicament as my son? His 2-household income was 900% the federal poverty level in 2022 so he's expected to pay $5000 for 21 pills every 28 days or $50,000/year (after receiving a $15,000 BMS grant).

The size of the payment from Celgene and BMS to Natco and Teva can be approximated. Under competitive conditions, there are typically three versions of a branded pharmaceutical available during the 180-day generic exclusivity period: the brand product itself, the first-to-file generic’s product, and the brand’s authorized generic or AG. The two generic products quickly capture most of the market. The generics compete on price, bringing the price of the generic products down to no more than 40% of the brand price. After the exclusivity period expires, additional generics enter the market and drive the price of the generics down further, sometimes to as little as 10% of the brand price.

Natco, Dr. Reddy’s, Lotus, Cipla, Sun, Zydus, Apotex settlements with Celgene:

On December 22, 2015, Celgene announced the settlement of litigation with Natco and its marketing partners Watson and Arrow International Limited (“Arrow”) relating to Celgene’s Revlimid patents.

On September 17, 2020, Celgene and BMS announced a settlement of the litigation with Dr. Reddy’s.

On March 29, 2019, Celgene and Lotus announced a settlement of the patent lawsuits.

On December 11, 2020, Celgene announced a settlement agreement with Cipla.

On June 21, 2021, Sun announced its settlement with Celgene.

Celgene and BMS subsequently sued, and then settled with, Zydus and Apotex on terms similar to those contained in the earlier agreements with Natco, Dr. Reddy, Lotus and Cipla.

Beginning in 2015, and continuing through the present day, Defendants have entered into a continuing unlawful contract, combination and conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Specifically, Celgene, BMS, Natco and Teva entered into an unlawful horizontal agreement to restrict output and allocate the Revlimid market beginning in March 2022, thereby transferring billions of dollars in value to Natco and later Teva in return for Natco’s agreement to delay the launch of its AB-rated generic Revlimid until March 1, 2022.

Defendants’ unlawful conspiracy (a) allocated to Celgene and BMS 100% of the U.S. sales of lenalidomide from at least 2019 until March 2022; (b) delayed the availability of generic lenalidomide from at least 2019 until March 2022; (c) allocated 7% of the Revlimid market to Natco and Teva from March 2022 until February 2023; (d) allocated unknown percentages of the Revlimid market to Natco and Teva from February 2023 through January 31, 2026; (e) restricted the output of generic lenalidomide from at least 2019 until January 31, 2026; (f) ensured that generic prices would remain artificially high, and generic substitution artificially low, from March 2022 until January 20, 2026; and (g) fixed and maintained, at supracompetitive levels, and will continue to fix and maintain at supracompetitive levels, the price Plaintiffs paid for lenalidomide from at least 2019 until January 30, 2026.

As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs have been forced to pay overcharges on their purchases of branded and generic Revlimid.